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      The furor in April 2007 over a remark by Don Imus was, at one level, a conflict between 
offensive speech and free speech.  The episode was a lesson too that free speech is disallowed if anyone 
takes offense at that speech, a curious lesson for Americans to learn.  Given our tradition of free speech as 
protected speech, the rejection of the principle of free speech in this instance is curious at best and 
troubling at worst.  No question of harm arises here; harmful speech is not protected.  No question of 
inoffensive speech arises either; inoffensive speech needs no protection.  It is offensive speech that is 
deserving of protection.  If protected speech has any meaning, its arena of concern has to be offensive 
speech. On another level, the Imus affair raises a question about the principle of toleration.  What he said 
about the Rutgers University Women’s Basketball Team was intolerable to the team, to many of his 
listeners, and, unfortunately for him, to his employers.  The shock-jock had at last gone too far.  
     Why was his offensive speech intolerable?  No matter how ugly or crude his remark, it would have 
seemed a plausible candidate for a toleration that has been generally recognized as a political principle at 
least since 1689, when John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration entered the mainstream of political 
philosophy.  While Locke’s emphasis was a toleration of religious differences, the principle qua principle 
applies also to non-religious differences in our times, the furor over offensive speech being one good 
example.  Clearly a political principle that occupies a solid place in our political traditions, toleration 
could have, perhaps should have, changed the character and outcome of the Imus episode.   
     That his crude remark was in fact intolerable rather than tolerable raises a question of whether there is 
indeed any way of distinguishing between the two categories, a difference sufficiently rational so as to 
allow toleration to remain in our political philosophy and value theory.  Observers of this melee are left 
wondering where the boundary line between the tolerable and the intolerable should be drawn, if indeed a 
boundary exists at all.  I am claiming that the boundary between the tolerable and the intolerable is fuzzy, 
and perhaps the distinction is in danger of collapsing entirely. My reflections look to John Locke’s 1689 
document and some of its implications.1 
     While Locke did not provide a definition per se of toleration, others have generously done so.  Some 
recent efforts come from interpreters like John Horton (1996), T.M.Scanlon (1996), Alex Tuckness 
(2002), Andrew Cohen (2004) and Andrew Fiala (2005).   
  Horton:  “…the refusal, where one has the power to do so, 
  to prohibit or seriously interfere with conduct that one finds 
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  objectionable.” (Heyd, p.28). 
 
  Scanlon:  “Tolerance requires us to accept people and permit 
  their practices even when we strongly disapprove of them.” 
  (Heyd, p.226). 
 
  Tuckness:  “…a theory of toleration will give reasons why we\ 
  should not put a stop to some action or state of affairs that  
  we think wrong and which we have the power to affect.”   
 
  Cohen:  “…an act that is an agent’s intentional and principled 
  refraining from interfering with an opposed other (or their 
  behavior, etc.) in situations of diversity, where the agent 
  believes she has the power to interfere.” 
 
  Fiala:  “When I tolerate something:  I have a negative judgment 
  about this thing (usually a person or his activities, where activity is  
  broadly conceived to include the actions, attitudes, and habits of  
  persons). I could negate this thing.  I deliberately refrain from 
  negating this thing.”  
 
  Locke’s plea for toleration is a plea for religious toleration in general and for a mutual toleration 
among Christians in particular.  This emphasis is not surprising, given the religious and political turmoil 
of the Tudor-Stuart epoch.  Readers cannot be surprised when Locke rails against Christians who 
“…deprive (men) of their estates, maim them with corporal punishments, starve and torment them in 
noisome prisons, and in the end even take away their lives…”2  An intolerance of this sort that finds 
expression in such violence is itself intolerable on several grounds, according to Locke.  It violates the 
mandates of charity and meekness that must characterize the true Christian.  Those guilty of such 
aggressive, violent intolerance are hypocritical in that they are frequently careless about their own virtue.  
Locke urges these to look to their own moral reformation and that of their family and friends.  Moreover 
they are spending time and effort on matters that are, as he implies, trivial, i.e., doctrinal matters and 
ceremonial preferences.  They bend their effort “…either to the introducing of ceremonies, or to the 
establishment of opinions, which for the most part are about nice and intricate matters that exceed the 
capacity of ordinary understandings…”3 Finally, intolerance of this kind is also pointless, because only 
Christ at the end of time can reveal which group is right, and all with have to wait until that time. 
     Thus beginning with a condemnation of religious intolerance that issues in violence, imprisonment and 
execution, Locke moves forward with advice and guidelines for toleration.  These dominate the bulk of 
this document. 
     Separation of church and state is a major premise underlying everything in the document, a clear 
separation of civil and religious authority.4  The role of government is to secure for its citizens the 
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“…procuring, preserving, and advancing…” of their civil interests, well-being and life.5  Magistrate is his 
word for one who wields civil authority.  It is the magistrate who is enjoined to tolerate any religious 
doctrine and practice, provided that these do not violate the rights of citizens or disrupt the peace.  Here, 
by implication, we have a twofold description of what are intolerable, viz. violations of the rights of 
citizens and crime, or, whatever is disruptive of peace.  While individuals will find crimes intolerable, 
they are not in a position, in Locke’s political philosophy, to redress or punish the crime.  Only a civil 
magistrate is empowered to respond to and to punish whatever is criminal and intolerable.  His coercive 
power must keep out of religious matters, as long as the religious matters are not detrimental to citizens’ 
rights and to the peace.  The scope of his authority is limited accordingly, and his coercive power is 
irrelevant to religious matters, because penalties do not convince the mind, Locke thinks, and true religion 
must be a matter of conviction. 
     On the religious side of the divide, religious authorities do not have any coercive power, for, according 
to Locke’s psychology, coercion is not persuasive in the matter of religious beliefs.  As J. Judd Owen 
reminds us, Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, a foundation of the Letter, limits the 
scope of human knowledge so that so-called revealed truths are mere conjecture.  No individual, whether 
private citizen, civil magistrate, or religious leader, can claim superior knowledge of religious matters.  
Nevertheless human faculties are adequate for an apprehension of the natural law, and so coercion is 
neither necessary nor sufficient in matters of religion.  Religious churches or religious societies must 
tolerate each other, even while each disagrees with doctrine and ceremonies in others.  “For every church 
is orthodox to itself; to others, erroneous or heretical.”6  Even idolatrous churches must be tolerated.  
Locke fears that, should we allow magistrates to control or destroy what he considers idolatry, this power 
might be extended, along a slippery slope, to ruin even orthodox churches.  
      Individual persons who are religious are similarly exhorted:  “No private person has any right in any 
manner to prejudice another person in his civil enjoyments because he is of another church or religion.”7 
One reason for thus enjoining toleration is respect for the autonomy of the other.  Because the other 
religion’s beliefs are freely chosen, as all religious beliefs must be, coercion and freedom cannot coexist 
in religious matters.  “No way whatsoever that I shall walk in against the dictates of my conscience will 
ever bring me to the mansions of the blessed.”8  Some skepticism serves the believer also in tolerating 
those who hold different religious doctrines.  Each religious person must surely be tolerant of others, 
realizing that no one person can hope to enjoy all truth, and all must wait for the full revelation by Christ 
at the end of time. 
     Lest a reader be tempted to accuse Locke of being too tolerant in the matter of religion, we must take 
note of other paragraphs in this document.  Men should enter some religious society or church, for God 
ought to be publicly worshipped.  Being without religion seems unthinkable to Locke. Avowed atheists 
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are not to be tolerated.  “Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have 
no hold upon an atheist.” 9 They are intolerable insofar as they represent a threat to political bonding, and 
probably less because they do not give to God deserved worship.   Roman Catholics are not to be 
tolerated, again for the political threat that they represent.  Catholics “…deliver themselves up to the 
protection and service of another prince…” 10 This would mean a foreign jurisdiction in one’s country, 
and any influence by the ruler of the Vatican States outside of the Vatican States is intolerable. Locke 
anticipates some bizarre religious practices, offering as one example the sacrifice of infants.  The 
magistrate should not tolerate such practices because he cannot tolerate them in the society at large.  A 
religious setting does not transform an illegal practice into a legal one.  
     The historical context of Locke’s treatment of toleration was one bedeviled by religious changes, 
religious turmoil, and political changes shaped in large measure by religious tensions.  It seems doubtful 
that Locke himself was deeply concerned about the doctrinal content of his Christianity, his comments on 
the “nice and intricate” nature of theology suggesting just this.  Lest one think, though, that religious 
differences are no longer important in a secularized age and that toleration is not concerned with religious 
matters, we have only to consider the so-called Culture Wars identified by James Davison Hunter and 
certainly consider Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations.  Though these books appeared in 1991 and 
1996 respectively, they are still viable as interpretations of our internal and external struggles.  Religious 
differences remain an arena of the struggle for toleration, as certainly as the problem of offensive speech.  
     A defining of toleration assumes a social context of free agents and a diversity of views in that society 
or organization.  An agent may be an individual person or a group (A).  A is in a pluralistic situation, 
where competing values and worldviews are the case.  Having reflected on, and freely chosen, a belief 
(X), he is prepared to explain and defend it, as well as govern his life by X.  For A, X is true, good, or 
right.  X may be almost anything, e.g. an idea, an action, a religious view, a law, a lifestyle, anything 
about which an agent may form a judgment.  X has some significance for A, because he is, after all, 
prepared to defend X as well as live his life according to X.  But there is in A’s world another agent, B, 
who is equally committed to a contrary view, Y.  A has a negative or critical view of Y, as B does, of X.  
To A, Y is foolish, or false or even evil; and B thinks of X in the same way.  
     ‘Negative judgment’ is overly broad and must be refined, because, when dealing with toleration, we 
are not dealing with all possible negative judgments.  For instance, A has a negative judgment about 
murder and crime generally. He may have actual power to intervene aggressively but he lacks the 
legitimacy to do so and must defer to the state and its coercive and punitive action, or to Locke’s 
magistrate.  Thus excluded from any question of law enforcement, toleration, if it is to exist, does so in a 
context of free and legitimate action.  What could Y be?  It could be the idea that the United States is the 
Great Satan; an action like offensive speech; a religious view like hell; a law that allows abortion; a 
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lifestyle that includes excessive smoking or drug addiction.  The offending idea, action, etc. is such that it 
matters to A, because A has a stake in the society, group, or state in which this offense exists. We must 
omit indifference posing as tolerance.  If one truly does not care, for example, when his neighbor watches 
television and whether he goes to church, he is indifferent.  ‘Toleration’ has to be reserved for those 
instances when A truly does care about the matter at hand.  An internal debate about whether or not to 
intervene is, to use William James’s expression, a live option, but only to one is not indifferent. 
     If A chooses not to intervene against that which offends him, it is possible that we can use the term 
‘toleration’ to describe his restraint.  The reasons for his non-intervention are crucial here. 
     Locke’s primary rationale for toleration is the autonomy of the other agent.  A, if he is to be tolerant on 
this basis, judges that the offending item (Y) is foolish, false, or evil and yet allows Y to continue.  He 
must suspend consideration of the substantive issue, i.e. the content of what is objectionable, and look 
only to its origin in a free agent.  The origin of the offense is more important than the offending belief, 
action, etc.  To be considered tolerant, then, one must ignore the substance or content and be satisfied 
merely with the knowledge that the other reached his conclusions autonomously.  If this is toleration, then 
toleration would not be content-sensitive.  A current TV program, Intervention, suggests one example. If 
a parent is upset about his son’s drugged-up world, can he be comforted by the knowledge that his son 
freely chose to take drugs?  Sudan provides an example of genocide:  Should the world community be 
comforted by the knowledge that Sudan’s rulers autonomously decided on a policy of genocide?  
Americans would still find terrorists’ determination to wipe us out intolerable, regardless of the autonomy 
of the terrorists’ decision.  Locke is saying that the autonomy of B is a sufficient condition for the 
existence of toleration by A. We can imagine many instances when considerations of the autonomy of the 
other will prevail as a justification for non-intervention. There are, however, instances when the 
substantive matters are so offensive that they outweigh considerations of autonomy. A may well decide 
that he will not tolerate his son’s drug addiction; A may decide that genocide is intolerable.  A Lockean 
autonomy works sometimes but not always, and, for this reason, is too narrow.   
     Locke’s second reason for toleration is skepticism.  A should consider that, after all, he may not have 
all truth and should temper his enthusiasm and commitment to his own belief.  Mill’s classic challenge in 
On Liberty might be persuasive here: the challenge presented by views that we think to be false has the 
merit of allowing sometimes for new truths to emerge.  Mill writes, “The fatal tendency of mankind to 
leave off thinking about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half their errors.”11 This is 
not a thorough-going skepticism but a procedural type approaching a modesty or diffidence. (“Who 
knows, maybe I’m wrong this time.”)  A complete skepticism is irrelevant here, because it will be 
indistinguishable from indifference.  A temporary or methodological doubt may be helpful.   One recent 
and favorable view of skepticism puts forth Socrates as an exemplar of such doubt.  “…Socrates claimed 
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that the only thing he knew was that he knew nothing.  Socratic doubt is a methodological first principle 
that demands that we be critically self-conscious.”12 The methodological doubt having served its purpose, 
the agent may still think, even after a protracted period of cleansing skepticism, that his neighbor should 
break his smoking addiction, or that the UN should intervene more aggressively in Sudan’s internal 
affairs. Skepticism would subvert the agent’s own position, rendering toleration moot.   Or, in the case of 
religion, the believer who believes that the basic truths of his tradition are divine revelation will not 
seriously consider those truths to be false. As with autonomy, skepticism provides little basis for 
toleration.  Locke seems not to have provided any good reason for the restraint and non-intervention that 
are necessary to toleration 
     Even if we bracket the question of the basis of toleration, we still have the question of the intervention. 
Intervention, in Locke’s understanding, refers to either the severe persecutions that attended the religious 
violence of sixteenth and seventeenth century England or to civil disabilities imposed by the dominant 
religious group on minority religious groups in England and Europe. Violence and even execution stand 
at one end of a continuum that presents many possible ways to conceive of intervention and non-
intervention. Andrew Cohen raises what may be an unanswerable question on how interfering 
interference need be.  What if a potentially tolerant person, while experiencing a negative emotional 
response to something objectionable, decides within himself to refrain from expressing his response and 
turns his attention to an entirely different matter.   The emotion, in Cohen’s view, does not qualify as 
action but is a non-behavioral response.  Cohen is implying that the person being tolerated must be able to 
view or experience the non-interference of the other person.  Internal upset, revulsion, strong emotion, 
etc. do not qualify as action.13 Somehow, this reductionist notion of human action does not do justice to 
ordinary experience.  
       Fiala’s study prefers the word ‘negation’:  “I deliberately refrain from negating this thing.”14 
Refraining from negation is, arguably, the broadest description of toleration.  Fiala argues that toleration 
includes a mandate to engage the other in critical but supportive dialogue: “…we should question and 
listen carefully to those with whom we disagree, while refraining from carrying out any negative actions 
implied by our negative judgment.”15 This urging to engage the other in respectful dialogue, a re-
articulation of Mill, is too broad, I suggest, to be helpful.  The notion of respect goes too far beyond 
toleration to help us in clarifying toleration.  I doubt that many people who are opposed to, say, producers 
of child pornography films, will engage these producers in respectful, critical dialogue.  There also are 
practical limitations to setting up opportunities for respectful dialogue, or engaging what may be truly 
offensive policies, ideas, etc. in a Socratic interchange. John Horton writes that toleration is a “…refusal, 
where one has the power to do so, to prohibit or seriously interfere with conduct that one finds 
objectionable,” but admits that the concept is still vague.  
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               “For instance, how serious must interference  
     with the disapproved conduct be for it to be 
   incompatible with toleration?  If, for example, 
   the sale of pornographic magazines is  
   restricted to specialty shops, because some 
   people object to them, should we regard this 
   as a tolerant or intolerant response to the 
   sale of pornography?”  16   
 
George Fletcher concludes, in his analysis of the toleration problem, that toleration is “…always the 
second-best solution.”  One would like to intervene, to do something about the problem, but cannot safely 
or effectively do so.  Homosexual behavior is one of his examples.  Even if one wished to prohibit and 
punish certain sexual acts, “…the invasion of privacy required to enforce the law is worse than the 
behavior in question.” 17 
 
  If Locke’s description of toleration seems, on the face of it, unworkable, the question of what 
part of it, if any, can be redeemed seems a fair line of inquiry.  Failing some such redemption we would 
have to declare the whole idea of toleration passé, or maybe its status as a principle governing social and 
political interchange would have been illusory.   
      His plea for religious toleration might have been explained either as a concern for the well-being of 
religion or for some non-religious reason.  While religious toleration is the purported topic of the Letter, 
Locke gives no evidence of being interested in religious doctrines or religious practices.  Rather, his 
language suggests that he finds religious differences too insignificant for discussion or commentary.  
Since the interest in religion is not here, an interest in the political ramifications is a plausible reading of 
Locke’s interest.   Locke’s concern was exclusively political in nature.  While religious matters, 
specifically religious violence and polarization along the lines of religious denominations, were the 
historical context in which he wrote, these were not the primary interest of this Letter.  This is a document 
on religious toleration only because religion had, and has, a potential for civil disruption.  A 
straightforward reading of the Letter reveals that Locke saw this potential and offered what he believed 
was a means for restoring civil stability and peace.  
         Restoring stability and maintaining peace require sovereignty, though, or a locus of political 
authority.  The sovereign has both power and authority to govern; he has legitimacy; he has control of all 
resources that support his governance.  Here, Locke anticipates Legal Positivism and later theorists like 
John Austin who wrote that Law is a dictate of the sovereign.  Sovereignty must use coercion in fulfilling 
its role.  As Locke read the broad sweep of Tudor-Stuart history, though, coercion in religious matters had 
not worked.  The futility of coercion in religious matters seems to have made an impact on Locke, for the 
Letter has a lot to say about coercion in religious matters.  
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          Since coercion is necessary to sovereignty, which is necessary to stability, and since coercion in 
religious matters is not only futile but also disruptive, church and state must be separate.  The Letter is an 
early call for church-state separation, but his call is made not for the benefit of religions but for the sake 
of political stability.  Sovereignty requires coercion; absent coercion, as in religion, there is no 
sovereignty.  But the state cannot exist without sovereignty.  For the state to exist, then, coercion must be 
allowed to civil authority but not allowed in religion.  If coercion in religious matters does not work, and 
toleration is a kind of non-coercion (non-interfering, etc.), toleration is the only practical alternative.  
There will be stability only if there is toleration in religion.  Toleration, then, becomes a necessary 
condition of political stability.    
          Historian Christopher Hill points thus to Locke’s political posture:  “Yet he was no democrat, and 
happily accepted 1688 as the revolution to end revolutions…by ‘the people’ he meant the propertied 
class.” 18 The Toleration Act of 1689 had destroyed any hope of establishing the unity of the national 
church and was aimed at reducing political opposition by some non-Anglican groups.  Locke’s Letter is a 
call for religious toleration only accidentally, in seventeenth-century England where religious affiliation 
and political commitment were conflated.  Anglicans were usually Royalist in politics; Protestants who 
dissented from the Church of England were Parliamentarians.  Locke’s call for toleration, then, was a 
rhetorically persuasive means of reiterating a call for unity.   
     Though we may wish to universalize his ideas, we cannot apply these ideas to situations different from 
those of seventeenth-century England.  His idea of toleration works only where there is a sect-preference, 
i.e. where one can speak of political stability by using religious labels.  Parliament passed the Toleration 
Act in May 1689, granting some liberties to Non-Conformists, i.e. Protestants who dissented from the 
Church of England (e.g. Baptists, Congregationalists, and Quakers).  Locke returned to England from 
Holland in February 1689; his Letter was published in Holland in May, though in Latin.  In October he 
published the English edition of the Letter, now that it was safe to do so.  James II had been driven into a 
French exile, and the Glorious Revolution in 1688, followed by the Toleration Act made his Letter more 
descriptive than prescriptive.  He had kept close and approving watch on events leading up to the ouster 
of James II and, in the Letter, publicly moved a bit beyond Parliament by calling for the extension of the 
same liberties to Anabaptists, Dissenters, Presbyterians, and Quakers. A coalition of these groups was 
needed for political stability.  Groups that were perceived as not needed for stability, or as inimical to it, 
were still intolerable, viz. Catholics, Unitarians, and atheists.  The doctrine of toleration, then, cannot be 
removed from the context of British history, specifically from a nation that had been fractured into 
political groups that operated under religious labels and banners.  The Letter was not a creative foray into 
groundbreaking political theory, because it offered little that was not already implied or suggested by the 
Toleration Act. 
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          Locke’s political interests naturally raise the question of what the state itself can tolerate.  Given its 
role in protecting the rights of citizens, e.g., life, liberty, health, and property, and in preserving good 
order, the state cannot tolerate anything that may harm these goods. “…No opinions contrary to human 
society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated 
by the magistrate.”19  Given the broad range of possible meanings to such terms as life, liberty, health, 
property, good order, the state need not tolerate very much at all. An analogy can be drawn to Mill, in On 
Liberty.  Having stated clearly that the prevention of harm can be the only justification for limiting 
personal liberty, Mill exempts those needing care, the residents in the British colonies being a significant 
group needing British care, rather than liberty.   
      It is possible that some citizens will not agree with the majority of citizens that these are indeed goods 
to be protected, but there is no evidence in the Letter that Locke, a liberal and a revolutionary, considered 
this possibility.  The public good is the rule and measure of all law-making. “If a thing be not useful to the 
commonwealth, though it be never so indifferent, it may not presently be established by law.” 20 If the 
state is looking out for the rights of the citizens, how could they possibly object?  The goals here to be 
achieved are obviously good.  What does it matter if the process of achieving them leaves something to be 
desired?   And what qualifies as disruptive of good civil order?  By implication, the state must exert 
compulsion and not tolerate any demurral from citizens not in the mainstream.  It must not tolerate their 
intolerance.  Supposedly the state must be neutral, viz. not embrace the views of some citizens while 
rejecting the views of other citizens.  But, as one Locke commentator, Stephen Douglas Smith, observes:  
“…this view is, itself, a distinct position not universally accepted.  So, to adopt even this, is to prefer the 
views of some citizens over the views of other citizens.”  And compulsion may, in time, generate “…a 
voluntary embrace of the orthodox position.” 21In practice, the state must take substantive stands and not 
tolerate contrary views, a possibility that would have posed a dilemma for Locke, had he considered it. 
     The historical particularity of Locke’s document, then, renders it less than applicable in another age 
and time.  Perhaps one may point out, though, in his defense, that he does provide a grounding for 
Parliamentary policy in his discussions of the basis of toleration, viz. in a respect for the autonomy of 
other persons and in a healthy skepticism or diffidence about one’s own ideas and values.  Clearly 
autonomy is necessary for an understanding of human choice.  The question of toleration does not even 
arise in the absence of autonomy.  For example, if we were to discover that the producer of a child 
pornography film had not acted autonomously, our search for the source would have to continue until we 
did find the film’s origin.  Having discovered the responsible persons, our judgments about child 
pornography films would, I would claim, remain as they had been: these films, whatever their origin and 
regardless of who is responsible, are morally unacceptable.  Considerations of autonomy are inadequate, 
though necessary, because they bracket considerations of content.  Autonomy, then, is not sufficient as a 
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basis of toleration.  Locke himself did not allow considerations of autonomy to prevail.  Had he respected 
autonomy, he could not have declared Catholics and atheists intolerable to British society.  Neither does 
Locke do well on the matter of skepticism, that healthy skepticism that borders on modesty and 
diffidence.  There is no evidence that Locke had any suspicion that he might, after all, be wrong and 
thereupon seek to engage an opponent in respectful dialog.  In the absence of evidence, one can say only 
that the Letter reveals that he was reiterating what the Toleration Act had already established and was 
himself confident that this new policy and the new age of William and Mary were a happy resolution to 
the anguish and violence of Tudor-Stuart England. 
     If toleration will not admit of some plausible articulation, neither does intolerance; any boundary line 
between the two would be a shifting affair.  The difference between them may well be purely contextual, 
that is, may depend on the circumstances of the event and on the personality of the agent. It is an 
interpretive challenge to a reader of the Letter to settle on an unambiguous picture of Locke’s true 
position.  While he is writing about toleration, he is also calling for a strongly sovereign state that need 
not tolerate much deviation from its citizens.  While writing about the need for religious toleration, he 
declares unequivocally that atheists and Roman Catholics are not to be tolerated.  While advocating 
skepticism as a basis for toleration, he gives no indication that he himself might be fallible.  While 
advocating the separation of church and state, there is no evidence that he worked to change the sect-
preference in an England where the head of state was, and is, the head of the Anglican Church.  
     The contextual and thus shifting character of toleration has contemporary instances. Salman Rushdie 
understands intolerance.  The Danish cartoons of the prophet Muhammad and the subsequent furor alerted 
everyone to the power of words, or, in that case, drawings.  One recent comment claims that, 
“Traditionally, Americans have protected speech, absent a risk of immediate unlawful violence, but when 
it comes to terrorism in today’s world, most countries, including the world’s democracies, are not as 
tolerant as they used to be.” 22American courts have not hesitated to declare some religious practices 
intolerable by construing them as harmful or as contrary to the community’s well-being, e.g. Mormon 
polygamy; Native Americans’ use of peyote; Santeria rites of animal sacrifice in Florida. 23 The Rutgers 
University Women’s Basketball Team did not believe that Don Imus’s autonomy redeemed what he had 
said, nor were they skeptical about their judgment of him.   
       Locke’s Letter contains the fault lines that still frustrate a plausible and reliable theory of toleration.  
The autonomy requirement, while necessary, is not sufficient for preserving genuine objections to 
content.  Skepticism removes the need to tolerate.  Only practical considerations are left, but these do not 
deserve the lofty status of principle.  Given the so-far elusive character of a theory of toleration, we could 
either give up the quest entirely, allowing the desire to articulate such a theory to wither away.  Or, we 
might find an alternative line of inquiry.  Perhaps defining ‘action’ itself could make a contribution. What 
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is ‘action’? Does judgment qualify as action? Does emotion qualify as action (e.g. an emotion of 
revulsion)? Or, was Andrew Cohen right in arguing that the tolerating action must be external and 
observable?  This, though, is an entirely separate task for another day. In practice, we know that Don 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                          
1 Locke wrote four letters on toleration, a topic that was one of on-going interest to him even before the 
publishing of the first Letter.  Their publication dates were 1689, 1690, 1692, 1704.  The second, third, 
and fourth were re-iterations of the first, with some modifications provoked by Jonas Proast, a persistent 
critic of Locke.  Lockean scholars prefer to read the first Letter, and I have followed their lead.  It is still 
an open question, though, whether the modifications in the later versions affect our interpretation of his 
understanding of toleration. 
 
2 A Letter Concerning Toleration, p.150. 
 
3 Ibid, p.151. 
 
4 Perhaps Jonathan Cohen is correct when he finds this separation analogous to the soul/body distinction.  
More suitable to Christianity than to Judaism, the soul/body distinction is an assumption that Locke never 
thinks to question.  “Some Jewish Reflections…”, p.65. 
 
5 Letter Concerning Toleration, p.152. 
 
6 Ibid, p.157. 
 
7 Ibid, p.156. 
 
8 Ibid, p.162. 
 
9 Ibid p.172. 
 
10 Ibid, p.171. 
 
11 On Liberty, in Three Essays, p.54. 
 
12 Tolerance and the Ethical Life, p.13. 
 
13 “What Toleration Is”, Ethics Vol.115, No.1 (October 2004), p.87. 
 
14 Tolerance and the Ethical Life, p.18. 
 
15 Ibid, p.34. 
 
16 “Tolerance as a Virtue, in Heyd, p.28. 
 
17 “The Instability of  Tolerance,” in Heyd, p.170. 
 
18 Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution 1603 – 1714, pp.244, 298. 
 
19 Letter Concerning Toleration, pp.170-171. 
 
20 Ibid, p.173. 
 
21 “Toleration and Liberal Commitments”, University of San Diego School of Law, Public Law and Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Paper 4, 2004.  http://law.bepress.com/sandiegolwps/pllt/art4.  Accessed 
6-19-07. 
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22 George Fletcher,“Declining Tolerance of Dangerous Words,” JapanTimesOnine.  February 2, 2007. 
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20070202a1.html.  Accessed 6-5-07. 
23 David Heyd, “The Instability of Tolerance” in Heyd, pp.163-4.  The Santeria case holds more judicial 
interest than most, having been resolved eventually by the US Supreme Court.  City ordinances of 
Hialeah, Florida prohibited animal sacrifice by the Santerians, who filed suit against the city.  While the 
District Court found for the city, the US Supreme Court reversed this judgment in Church of Lukumi 
Babalu Aye v City of Hialeah in 1993.  The case has been studied by David M. O’Brien in his book Animal 
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